



# Economic Analysis of Self-Help

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# I. Research Motivation



# I. Research Motivation

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## What is self-help?

- Rights are infringed
- No neutral third party to resolve the dispute
- Rely on own force or effort
- Without going to court or arbitration

## Examples

- Pickpocket
- “Okupas”(Squatting)
- [www.airhelp.com](http://www.airhelp.com)





# I. Research Motivation

## Questions ...

- Why do so many people choose to use self-help to defend their rights?
- How do self-help relate to other tools in the rights redress system?
- How should the law respond to self-help?

## Why important?

- In many areas of extreme inequality and institutional backwardness
- In developed industries and new rights
- Law and justice outside courts





# I. Research Motivation

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**Self-Help in the Redress System: A Game Theory Model**



**Choices in the Real World: A Behavioral Experiment**



**Legal Responses to Self-Help: Empirical Findings**





## **II. Self-Help in the Redress System: A Game Theory Model**




## II. Self-Help in the Redress System

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### Systematic view of self-help

- “You think I'm trying to help myself? I was having to help myself!”





## II. Self-Help in the Redress System

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### Court system

- **1**: the infringed party; **2**: the infringer
- **C<sub>1</sub>**: cost and effort of the infringed party; **C<sub>2</sub>**: cost and effort of the infringer
- **Payoffs in the very beginning**: (0, T)

### How should the court decide?

- Give the property to the people who values it most!
- Let  $p$  represent the probability that  $C_1$  win the game, then...
- $C_1 \gg C_2 \Rightarrow p = 1$ ;  $C_2 \gg C_1 \Rightarrow p = 0$ ;  $C_1 = C_2 \Rightarrow p = 0.5$
- $\frac{\partial p}{\partial C_1} > 0$  and  $\frac{\partial^2 p}{\partial C_1^2} < 0$ ;  $\frac{\partial p}{\partial C_2} > 0$  and  $\frac{\partial^2 p}{\partial C_2^2} < 0$

$$\text{e.g. } p = \frac{C_1}{C_1 + C_2}$$





## II. Self-Help in the Redress System

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### Court system (cont.)

- Rule: the people who puts more effort in sue wins the game; the lost pay both parties' cost.
- For the infringed party:

$$E_1 = \frac{C_1}{C_1 + C_2} \times T + \left(1 - \frac{C_1}{C_1 + C_2}\right) \times (-C_1 - C_2) = \frac{C_1}{C_1 + C_2} \times T - C_2$$

- For the infringer:

$$E_2 = \frac{C_1}{C_1 + C_2} \times (-C_1 - C_2) + \left(1 - \frac{C_1}{C_1 + C_2}\right) \times T = \frac{C_1}{C_1 + C_2} \times T - C_1$$

- **And they want to maximize their expectation!**



## II. Self-Help in the Redress System

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### Court system (cont.)

- For the infringed party:

$$\frac{\partial E_1}{\partial C_1} = \dots = \frac{T \times C_2}{(C_1 + C_2)^2} \geq 0$$

- For the infringer:

$$\frac{\partial E_2}{\partial C_2} = \dots = \frac{T \times C_1}{(C_1 + C_2)^2} \geq 0$$

- **The optimal strategy is to keep increasing inputs until the maximum => Chicken Game!**



## II. Self-Help in the Redress System

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### What about settlement?

- Coase Theory ...
- “Who are you to talk to me about settlement?”
- No incentive

### And self-help?

- Dynamic games
- Backward induction
- Threats harsh enough

=> **Compromise!**






## **III. Choices in the Real World: A Behavioral Experiment**




# III. Choices in the Real World



<https://self-help-english.onrender.com/join/kizodini>



# III. Choices in the Real World





## **IV. Legal Responses to Self-Help: Empirical Findings**



## IV. Legal Responses to Self-Help

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**Does more refined legislation on self-help leads to less inappropriate self-help?**

- E.g., China Civil Code (2020)
- Difference in differences

**Does reducing the expense of the justice system and increasing the speed of litigation help reduce inappropriate self-help?**

- Online litigation reform
- Many empirical method

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**Wish you a happy day!**

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